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The Allied Occupation of Japan - an Australian View 
Abstract 
The Japanese Occupation is generally remembered as primarily an American affair and as a dichotomous 
relationship between Japan and the United States. However, it was an Allied Occupation, and, despite the 
persistence of selective historical memories, there was a distinct and at times contentious Allied 
presence, contribution, and experience. The Occupation provided a terrain on which the victor nations, 
believing their social, economic and political values vindicated by victory, competed to reshape the 
character of Japan's modernity. One Ally that participated in this process, and often acted as a dissenting 
voice, was Australia. Examining the involvement of additional participants in the Occupation does not 
challenge the notion of US dominance, but does demonstrate that others periodically played significant 
roles in both administering the Occupation and in challenging US policies. 
Keywords 
allied, occupation, japan, view, australian 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
de Matos, C. (2005). The Allied Occupation of Japan - an Australian View. Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan 
Focus, July 2005 1-3. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1321 
The Allied Occupation of Japan – an Australian View
By Christ ine de Matos
The Japanese Occupatio n is  generally remembered as  primarily an American affair and as  a dicho to mo us  relatio nship between Japan
and the United States . Ho wever, it was  an Allied Occupatio n, and, despite the pers is tence o f selective his to rical memo ries , there was
a dis tinct and at times  co ntentio us  Allied presence, co ntributio n, and experience. The Occupatio n pro vided a terrain o n which the
victo r natio ns , believing their so cial, eco no mic and po litical values  vindicated by victo ry, co mpeted to  reshape the character o f
Japan’s  mo dernity. One Ally that participated in this  pro cess , and o ften acted as  a dis senting vo ice, was  Aus tralia. Examining the
invo lvement o f additio nal participants  in the Occupatio n do es  no t challenge the no tio n o f US do minance, but do es  demo ns trate that
o thers  perio dically played s ignificant ro les  in bo th adminis tering the Occupatio n and in challenging US po licies .
Aust ralian part icipat io n
Aus tralia was  a party to  the Occupatio n bo th diplo matically and militarily. Fo r ins tance, an Aus tralian delegatio n participated in the
Far Eas tern Co mmiss io n (FEC) in Washingto n, an Aus tralian represented the British Co mmo nwealth o n the Allied Co uncil fo r Japan
(ACJ) in To kyo , an Aus tralian, William Flo o d Webb, pres ided o ver the Internatio nal Military Tribunal o f the Far Eas t (IMTFE), and an
Aus tralian military co ntingent, alo ng with Britain, British India and New Zealand, co ntributed to  the British Co mmo nwealth
Occupatio n Fo rces  (BCOF). 
The Aus tralians  were s tatio ned in Hiro shima prefecture, with their base at Hiro  (the BCOF HQ was  at Kure). At its  height in 1946,
Aus tralia pro vided aro und 12,000  tro o ps  to  the to tal o f 40 ,000  BCOF tro o ps  (US tro o ps  numbered 152,000).[1] Ho wever, by 1948
Britain, India and New Zealand had withdrawn fro m Japan, leaving Aus tralia as  the so le representative o f the Co mmo nwealth fo rces ,
at leas t until the o utbreak o f the Ko rean War. An Aus tralian acted as  Co mmander-in-Chief o f BCOF fo r the duratio n o f the
Occupatio n. This  article fo cuses  o n Aus tralia's  diplo matic co ntributio n to  the Occupatio n.
While clo se attentio n has  been paid to  the ideo lo gical co nflict between the So viet Unio n and the United States , the neglected
co nflict between Aus tralia and the United States , as  well as  their co o perative actio ns , cas ts  further light o n the nature o f the
o ccupatio n. Fo r the firs t fo ur years  o f the Occupatio n, Aus tralia had a left-wing Aus tralian Labo r Party (ALP) go vernment under Ben
Chifley, and a co ntentio us  and o utspo ken fo reign minis ter in H.V. Evatt. Thus  there was  great po tential and much ammunitio n fo r
co nflict to  o ccur o ver the pro gress  o f Occupatio n refo rms , especially after the so -called ‘reverse co urse’ in Occupatio n po licies . The
Chifley go vernment had its  o wn agenda that it wished to  impo se upo n Japan. Militarily, diplo matically, eco no mically and po litically,
this  was  o f co urse an unequal battle. Yet, in the early po s t-ho s tilities  enthus iasm fo r a new wo rld o rder, the Aus tralian go vernment
was  co nfident o f co ntributing to  its  creatio n – whether in the UN, o r in Occupied Japan – and to o k a number o f initiatives  that were
actively addressed, if no t always  implemented.
T he ro le o f  t he empero r
One o f the bes t-kno wn po ints  o f co ntentio n between Aus tralia and the United States  o ccurred o ver the po s itio n o f the empero r in
po s twar Japan. Aus tralia’s  po s itio n has  been po rtrayed as  o ne o f s imple retributio n fo r war crimes . While po pulis t rheto ric pandered
to  anti-Japanese pass io ns  amo ngs t the Aus tralian electo rate, the o fficial po licy po s itio n was  a little mo re co mplex. The is sue o f the
empero r had two  main co mpo nents : firs t, the ques tio n o f the trial and punishment o f the empero r as  a war criminal; and seco nd,
the future o f the imperial ins titutio n in the co ntext o f po litical refo rm. 
The Aus tralian go vernment, like the United States , advo cated tho ro ughgo ing demo cratic refo rm. Ho wever, they differed o n ho w this
was  bes t acco mplished. While, fro m at leas t 1945, Aus tralia favo red eliminating the empero r sys tem as  the way fo rward fo r
demo cratic revo lutio n, this  was  to  be decided by the Japanese peo ple as  so o n as  co nditio ns  permit a freely determined decis io n.
Po litical mo vements  aiming at the abo litio n o f the ins titutio n o f Empero r o r his  reductio n to  a co ns titutio nal head o f State [are] to
be allo wed freedo m o f o rganizatio n and pro paganda.[2]
In o ther wo rds , while this  was  to  be a decis io n made by the Japanese peo ple, the Aus tralian go vernment held that the Allies  sho uld
enco urage mo vements  sympathetic to  their agenda. By co ntras t, the US po s itio n was  no t o nly that the imperial ins titutio n in
mo dified fo rm sho uld be maintained, but also  that Hiro hito  remain o n the thro ne to  help avo id widespread chao s . Aus tralian so cial,
eco no mic and po litical po licies  to wards  Japan, in many ways  mo re radical than US po licies , were unencumbered by any attachment to
the thro ne, o r to  maintaining the so cial s tatus  quo . 
Fo r Aus tralia, co mmunism in Japan was  no t seen to  be a great threat: a return to  militarism was . The Japanese peo ple,
unencumbered by the mo narchy, were seen as  a po ss ible so urce o f pro tectio n agains t militarism. If the Aus tralian go vernment did
no t carry great internatio nal weight in the matter, it did pro vide a reaso ned and co ns is tent vo ice calling fo r the trial o f the empero r
as  a war criminal. SCAP/GHQ, while unyielding o n this  po int, used this  aspect o f Aus tralian po licy to  invo ke fear amo ng
unco o perative Japanese leaders  – that is , the threat to  take such is sues  as  the co ns titutio n to  the FEC where, it was  alleged, the
Aus tralians  and So viets  wo uld demand the abdicatio n o f the empero r, o r wo rse. It was  a highly effective tactic that maximised
American leverage witho ut achieving Aus tralian go als .
T he po st war co nst it ut io n
Differences  in po licies  to wards  the empero r became manifes t in the po s itio ns  o f the US and Aus tralia o n the co ns titutio n. At the
end o f the As ia-Pacific War, Aus tralia so ught to  create the o ppo rtunity fo r the Japanese peo ple to  debate and mo dify the exis ting
Meiji co ns titutio n. This  appro ach, a ‘res to ratio n’ o f demo cracy, was  believed to  make it less  likely that the Japanese peo ple wo uld
later reject the co ns titutio n as  an impo s itio n.[3] When the fait acco mpli o f the so -called ‘MacArthur co ns titutio n’ became evident,
Aus tralia and o ther members  o f the FEC turned to  analys ing the draft and submitting pro po sed changes . Impo rtant Aus tralian
sugges tio ns  included the guarantee o f universal suffrage, and the s tipulatio n that the prime minis ter and s tate o fficials  sho uld be
civilians , bo th o f which were inco rpo rated into  the co ns titutio n during Diet deliberatio ns  in September 1946. [4] 
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MacArthur reacted to  the FEC sugges tio ns  by s tating that this  was  ‘a co mplete repudiatio n o f the requirement that the co ns titutio n
mus t be a free express io n o f the peo ple’s  will’. He warned that the Japanese wo uld ‘unques tio nably bear so me resentment agains t
such allied interference’, thereby attempting to  maintain the charade that the co ns titutio n had so le Japanese autho rship.[5] Thus
began a s truggle between MacArthur and Aus tralian diplo mats  o ver who  o r what bes t reflected the ‘will’ o f the Japanese peo ple in the
new co ns titutio n. In this  ins tance, Aus tralia succeeded in shaping the co ns titutio n in s ignificant ways .
On 17 Octo ber 1946, the FEC ado pted ‘Pro vis io ns  fo r the Review o f a New Japanese Co ns titutio n’ to  co unteract the fait acco mpli.
Sent to  MacArthur as  an FEC po licy directive, the ‘Pro vis io ns ’ were inspired by H.V. Evatt, and were intended to  pro vide an o ppo rtunity
fo r the Japanese peo ple to  ‘judge the Co ns titutio n in the light o f their experience o f its  wo rking’.[6 ] The o bjective was  to  have the
pro vis io n attached to  the Co ns titutio n at pro mulgatio n, in o rder to  ensure that the Japanese peo ple were aware o f their right to
co mment and have public debate o n the Co ns titutio n, and, if deemed necessary, amend it. While Evatt favo red a public referendum
o n the co ns titutio n as  the final act o f review, the FEC po licy o nly specified this  as  an o ptio n, the preferred o ptio n being that the Diet
and the FEC co nduct the review within o ne to  two  years  o f the co ns titutio n taking effect. 
MacArthur’s  reactio n was  swift and ho s tile. He claimed that the Aus tralian pro po sal co ns tituted inappro priate Allied interference in
Japanese po litical affairs . With the US go vernment maneuvering to  maintain autho rity in the hands  o f SCAP, specifically pro po s ing
that it be left to  the dis cretio n o f MacArthur whether to  publish it, Aus tralians  o n the FEC pro vided the mo s t vo cifero us  challenge.
They claimed it wo uld be disho nes t no t to  let the Japanese peo ple kno w they had the right o f review.[7] In the end, MacArthur agreed
to  publicatio n o f the Pro vis io ns  o uts ide o f Japan (in March 1947, two  mo nths  befo re the co ns titutio n was  to  take effect), while
exercis ing censo rship within Japan. Altho ugh the ‘Pro vis io n’ was  leaked to  the Japanese press  in March 1948, with the co ns titutio n
already in effect, it had little public impact. 
When it came time fo r the ‘Pro vis io ns ’ to  take effect in 1948 , the Ashida go vernment began a review pro cess , as  did two  Japanese
research gro ups , the Public Law fo rum (Ko ho  kenkyukai) and the Co ns titutio nal Research Co mmittee o f To kyo  Univers ity (Kempo
kenkyukai). Ho wever, MacArthur and the seco nd Yo shida go vernment, which to o k o ffice after the fall o f the Ashida go vernment in
19 48 , halted the review pro cess . On the FEC, the Aus tralian delegatio n enco uraged the review but, given the lack o f suppo rt fro m
Washingto n and To kyo  within the Occupatio n co ntext o f the ‘reverse co urse’, it was  co nducted witho ut enthus iasm. 
In 1949, the FEC sent so me pro po sals  fo r dis cuss io n to  SCAP, including:
1. Queries  o ver the use o f the terms  ko kumin (citizens ) and nambito  (all perso ns), as  ‘it was  no t clear ho w the Co ns titutio n
guarantees  fundamental civil rights  to  all perso ns  within Japanese jurisdictio n (as  dis tinguished fro m Japanese citizens )’;
2. Greater clarity to  be given to  empo wer the Supreme Co urt to  determine co ns titutio nality;
3. Greater clarity des irable in Articles  7 and 69  o n the pro cedures  fo r the dis so lutio n o f the Ho use o f Representatives .[8]
The firs t po int related directly to  the vo latile is sue o f the rights  o f Ko reans  and Taiwanese res idents  o f Japan who  had been deprived
o f the citizenship rights  enjo yed under co lo nial rule fo llo wing Japan's  defeat. 
Ho wever, these sugges tio ns  were no t sent as  an FEC po licy directive, but were s imply submitted to  SCAP, there was  no  imperative
fo r MacArthur, o r anyo ne else, to  co ns ider, no  less  act o n, them. And, in a year in which such co ntentio us  is sues  as  the ‘red purges ’
and Do dge eco no mic s tabilisatio n pro gram aro se, no  o ne did. In the end, Evatt’s  o riginal ideal that the Japanese peo ple wo uld have
a vo ice in assess ing, shaping and revis ing their o wn co ns titutio n was  lo s t. No w appro aching s ix decades  o n, there has  been no
amendment to  the Co ns titutio n, altho ugh co ntro vers ial changes  are currently being pressed by the ruling Liberal Demo cratic Party.
Labo ur refo rm
Further co nflict between Aus tralia and the United States  centered o n the ro le o f the labo ur mo vement. The two  co untries  had very
different labo ur his to ries  and their ideas  fo r the place o f labo ur in Occupied Japan differed in fundamentals . The Aus tralian
delegatio n was  ins trumental in framing FEC labo ur po licy encapsulated in ‘Principles  fo r Japanese Trade Unio ns ’. Inco rpo rating
Aus tralian (and British/Euro pean) experience, the ideal it put fo rth o f a po liticised labo ur mo vement, that is  a labo ur mo vement that
wo uld seek po litical representatio n in go vernment by suppo rting o r creating a po litical party that reflected its  interes ts , was
anathema to  bo th MacArthur and the US go vernment, pro viding a fertile so urce fo r Allied co nflict.
The Aus tralian go vernment pro tes ted many aspects  o f Occupatio n labo ur po licy, including MacArthur's  1 February s trike ban o f 1947
as  Japanese labo ur mo bilised to  carry o ut a general s trike. The different appro aches  o f the Allies  to  labo ur is sues  are bes t
exemplif ied in the revis io n o f the Natio nal Public Service Law (NPSL) fro m 1948  to  1949. Patrick Shaw, an Aus tralian representing
the British Co mmo nwealth to  the ACJ (1947-1949), pro tes ted the remo val o f the right to  s trike fo r all go vernment emplo yees  under
the revis io n, and, even mo re, the lack o f an independent arbitratio n bo dy. Shaw pro tes ted publicly in the ACJ as  well as  privately to
SCAP/GHQ. Pro tes ts  also  emerged o n the FEC, led by the Aus tralian delegatio n, and the Aus tralians  pro po sed a new FEC pro vis io n
that read ‘pro vis io ns  o f F.E.C.-045/5 (Principles  fo r Japanese Trade Unio ns ) sho uld be applied to  wo rkers  in Japanese go vernment
enterprises .’[9 ] 
In the face o f widespread suppo rt fo r this  initiative o n the FEC, MacArthur accused Aus tralia and Britain o f us ing Japanese labo ur to
further ‘their o wn so cialis tic experiments ’[10] and the US State Department called in Aus tralian FEC delegates  to  press  them to  dro p
their pro po sal o n the gro unds  that it wo uld serve to  heighten co mmunis t activities  in Japan.[11] Eventually, under US pressure and
delay tactics , the Aus tralian pro po sal fell into  abeyance. With a change o f go vernment in Aus tralia fro m the ALP to  Ro bert Menz ies ’
co nservative Liberal Party, the pro po sal was  never revived. One change was  quietly gained: the NPSL in its  final fo rm co ntained a
mo re independent arbitratio n machinery mechanism than when it was  firs t envis io ned. It was  a small and subtle victo ry, but o ne
no netheless .
Land refo rm
One area in which there was  subs tantial U.S-Aus tralia agreement, and where the Aus tralian co ntributio n was  s ignificant, was  land
refo rm. When MacArthur surpris ingly asked the ACJ fo r advice o n land refo rm, William Macmaho n Ball, an Aus tralian
academic/diplo mat representing the British Co mmo nwealth o n the ACJ (1946-1947), and his  eco no mic adviso r, Eric E. Ward,
respo nded with enthus iasm. Ward’s  research into  the is sue led him to  believe that the 3 cho  Landlo rd Average Maximum Retained
Area (LAMRA), as  pro po sed by SCAP/GHQ’s  Wo lf Ladejinsky and William Gilmartin, was  to o  large, as  it wo uld o nly release abo ut 45
percent o f tenanted land fo r trans fer. Ward calculated that fo r land refo rm to  be a success , it wo uld be necessary to  release 70
percent, and a o ne cho  LAMRA wo uld therefo re be required. When Macmaho n Ball presented this  as  part o f a 10-po int pro gram to  the
ACJ, MacArthur respo nded that the pro po sal was  ‘mo s t co ns tructive and valuable’.[12] 
Ball was  then surprised to  read in the Mainichi Shimbun o n 2 July 1946  that the Japanese go vernment had prepared a land refo rm bill
‘o n its  o wn initiative’ that inco rpo rated ‘in a mo s t exact and detailed way the ten po ints  pro gram’ he had submitted to  the ACJ.[13]
Ogura Takekazu, an o fficial invo lved in drafting the bill, wro te in 1979  that the Ball-Ward pro po sal co ntained the clear ideas  lacking
in the US 9  December directive, and was , therefo re, used extens ively to  help draft the bill.[14] Reference to  the Aus tralian ro le in
land refo rm is  rare in Occupatio n his to rio graphy. In this  area where Aus tralian and SCAP views  meshed, and where they were also
synchro no us  with a s ignificant Japanese po licy gro up, Aus tralia was  able to  play an impo rtant ro le in crafting the pro gram.
Co nclusio n
Occupied Japan was  an ideo lo gical battlegro und fo r co ntes ting ideas  co ncerned with charting Japan's  po s twar trans fo rmatio n, with
the US vo ice do minant. The Aus tralian Chifley go vernment pro po sed an alternative appro ach, what it termed ‘so cial demo cracy’,
between the extremes  o f So viet co mmunism and American lais sez  faire individualism. Ho wever, in the manichean co ntext o f the Co ld
War, in many po licy realms  the Aus tralian vo ice, as  well as  o ther alternate vo ices  fro m within and witho ut Japan, tended to  disappear
fro m the his to rical reco rd. In so me fields , ho wever, o f which land refo rm is  mo s t s triking, Aus tralian pro po sals  shaped s ignificant
po licy o utco mes , while in o thers , they shaped the terrain o f debate.
The po litical divis io ns  apparent in the Occupatio n era are manifes t again to day – the ALP, no w in o ppo s itio n, so metimes  reflects  a
dis senting vo ice to  US/Aus tralian co nservative po licy in Iraq, tho ugh rather mo re subtly than in Chifley’s  time, and witho ut the
po litical weight o f a party ho lding the reins  o f go vernment. The is sues  are no t s imply o f his to rical interes t: the debate abo ut the
co ns titutio n is  o ne o bvio us  example o f the co ntempo rary currency o f co ntes ted is sues  o f the 1940s . In o rder to  take the
‘inevitability’ o ut o f teleo lo gical perspectives , it is  wo rthwhile remembering the alternative and dis senting vo ices  o f the Occupatio n –
bo th in terms  o f their so metimes  subtle o r fo rgo tten co ntributio ns , and o f the paths  no t taken that can be as  integral to  o ur
his to rical unders tanding as  tho se that were.
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